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ABSTRACT: Departing from the postulates of Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators on
metonymic anaphora (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de
Mendoza; Díez 2004), this paper analyzes some of the most outstanding cases of anaphoric
reference to a metonymic antecedent in four best sellers. Antecedent selection turns up
problematic in certain cases. These difficulties are considerably reduced, however, by means
of the distinction between simple and double metonymies, and some constraints and
principles that govern the selection of the anaphoric referent: Constraint on Metonymic
Anaphora, Domain Availability Principle, Domain Combinability Principle, and Domain
Precedence Principle. The operation of mappings and principles is described through the
analysis of real language examples. The phenomenon of metonymic anaphora is surveyed
along with cases of implicative reference, through which these scholars account for otherwise
problematic cases of anaphoric reference. Ruiz de Mendoza’s is a highly comprehensive
approach as far as metonymic anaphora is concerned, but further research should be carried
out regarding its relationship with implicative reference.
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RESUMEN: Partiendo de los postulados sobre anáfora metonímica de Ruiz de Mendoza y sus
colaboradores (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de
Mendoza; Díez 2004), el presente artículo analiza algunos de los casos más significativos de
referencia anafórica a antecedentes metonímicos en cuatro best sellers. La selección del
antecedente se muestra problemática en algunos casos; sin embargo, estas dificultades se ven
reducidas considerablemente con la distinción entre metonimias simples y dobles, así como
varias constricciones y principios que gobiernan la selección del referente anafórico:
Constricción de Anáfora Metonímica, Principio de Disponibilidad de Dominios, Principio de
Combinabilidad de Dominios y Principio de Precedencia de Dominios. La operabilidad de
estos mapeos y principios se describe detalladamente en este artículo mediante una selección
de ejemplos reales. El fenómeno de anáfora metonímica se analiza en conjunción con casos
de referencia implicativa mediante los que estos académicos dan cuenta de casos de
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referencia anafórica que podrían llegar a ser problemáticos. El enfoque de Ruiz de Mendoza
demuestra ser exhaustivo y completo en lo que respecta a la anáfora metonímica, aunque
parece necesario llevar a cabo más estudios versados en su relación con casos de referencia
implicativa.
Palabras clave: metonimia, referencia anafórica, referencia implicativa, CMA, DAP, DCP, DPP.
1. Introduction
The study of metaphoric and metonymic ICMs as conceptual organization devices
has brought the attention of many ever since the emergence of the cognitive paradigm
(Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).1 Since then, ICMs have been tackled from rather
different perspectives. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002: 490), for their part, define ICM as:
A cognitive structure, which is idealised for the purpose of understanding and reasoning, and
whose function is to represent reality from a certain perspective. […] The term ICM, in being
all-encompassing, designates any concept constructed on the basis of what we know about
the world.
The study of metaphor early became the focus of many studies. Interest in
metonymy, however, had a later awakening with a focus on the typology of metonymies,
their definitional traits, their differences with metaphors (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff,
1987; Lakoff; Turner, 1989; Langacker, 1993; Croft 1993; Kövecses; Radden, 1998;
etc.), as well as on the potential of metonymy to explain inferential processes and
implicated-explicated meaning (Panther; Thornburg, 1998; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal,
2002).
Nevertheless it has been claimed (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal,
2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004) that the distinction between metaphor and
metonymy has not been clearly drawn by many authors, as most studies provide just
“working definitions” that fail to fully provide thorough distinguishing criteria between
them. This group of scholars developed their own account of metonymy with a high
predictive potential on the grounds of a series of rather simple distinctions and
constraints. These distinguishing criteria stem from a single distinction based merely on
domain internal-external mappings. All other criteria proposed previously by authors
like, say, Lakoff (1987), Lakoff; Johnson (1989) – e.g. predicative metaphors vs.
referential metonymies – or Croft (1993) – e.g. domain highlighting – become thus side-
effects of this domain internal-external distinction.
Ruiz de Mendoza (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza;
Otal (2002) define metonymy as a conceptual mapping within a single domain, which
establishes a strong opposition with metaphor – this requires domain-external mappings.
1. Research for this paper was sustained by a MECD grant (ref. AP2003–3771).
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On the grounds of this domain-subdomain inclusion relationship, these scholars put
forward two kinds of metonymies that encompass all instances found in discourse:
source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies.
In source-in-target (S-IN-T) metonymies the source domain is a subdomain of the
target domain. The source domain provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a
domain expansion process, ends in the target domain.
In target-in-source (T-IN-S) metonymies the target domain is a subdomain of the
source domain. The latter provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a domain
reduction process, ends in the target domain. In both cases, the main domain is known
as the matrix domain. 
Besides having a communicative import (e.g. being intentionally vague, saving the
speaker/hearer extra processing effort, etc.), this dichotomy clearly shows the impact of
metonymies on all linguistic levels. For example the T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction is relevant
to provide explanation for linguistic phenomena like cases of anaphoric reference to
metonymic antecedents. As shown in this study, Ruiz de Mendoza’s account on
metonymy demonstrates that the principles underlying anaphoric reference are not
totally grammatical, but work on the basis of conceptual processes. 
1.1. Metonymy and Anaphora
The scientific community has attempted to offer solutions for most intricate
examples of anaphoric reference to metonymic antecedents, but many of them remain at
a surface descriptive level as no proper explanations for the motivation of the analysed
phenomena seem to have been provided yet (Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002). In this
regard, Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2004) overcome the
shortcomings of previous accounts on this topic (e.g. Nunberg, 1995; Stirling, 1996) by
putting forward a further distinction between simple and double metonymies (i.e.
metonymies working with one and two matrix domains respectively) and propose a
series of constraints and principles that govern the use of anaphora with both kinds of
metonymies, namely: Constraint on Metonymic Anaphora (CMA), Domain Availability
Principle (DAP) (both working for simple and double metonymies), Domain Precedence
Principle (DPP), and Domain Combinability Principle (DCP) (which apply in double
metonymies). Furthermore, they include the notion of implicative reference, which
allows them to account for apparently problematic cases.
Their contentions are substantiated through a wide series of examples (Ruiz de
Mendoza, 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004).
Nevertheless, most of them may not be considered “real” in that they are created ad hoc
to illustrate their proposals, which might be envisaged as a shortcoming in attesting the
empirical value of their approach.
It will be the main aim of this paper, then, to provide their approach with
empirically attested evidence by probing their contentions through a series of usage-
based real English language examples.
Further evidence will also be provided regarding how this T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction
and the domain-inclusion relationship allow Ruiz de Mendoza to account for virtually
CLR-Nº 5-CORREC  28/5/08  11:52  Página 77
78 CULTURA, LENGUAJE Y REPRESENTACIÓN / CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION ˙ ISSN 1697-7750 ˙ VOL. V \ 2007, pp. 75-91
any instance of anaphora to a metonymic antecedent. In order to do so, this study will
draw on his theory of metonymy and his postulates on the principles that govern
metonymic anaphora in single and double metonymies. 
Both kinds of metonymies and their underlying working principles will be analyzed
with the help of a series of examples of metonymic anaphora extracted from a corpus
made up by four best sellers. The instances presented in this paper are thus real samples
of metonymic anaphora involving demonstrative, personal, possessive, relative
pronouns, and possessive adjectives. Our examples, therefore, can be considered real-
language-use pieces of evidence of the comprehensiveness and predictive potential of
this account of metonymy.
2. Method
A total of 77 examples containing instances of anaphoric reference to a metonymic
antecedent and implicative reference of anaphoric devices to specific frame elements
were compiled in order to substantiate our claims. Cases of simple and double
metonymies wherein one matrix domain or subdomain work as the antecedent of any of
the anaphoric devices listed above were searched in Michael Moore’s Stupid White Men
(SWM), Dude, Where’s My Country? (DWMC), and Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code
(TDVC), Deception Point (DP), which compose the corpus of real written language used
in this study.
3. Results and Discussion
The principles postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators must be
understood as general rules underlying the relationship between metonymies and
anaphora in cases which an anaphoric pronoun makes reference to a metonymic
antecedent. These principles interact with one another in a way that, when more than one
hold in the same example, they may render it more acceptable than in cases where only
one of them applies. This interaction becomes even more obvious when double
metonymies are involved. In these cases, although the DAP continues to apply, the DCP
and DPP play a crucial role.
3.1. DAP and CMA. Simple Metonymies
The DAP is the strongest principle and the only that applies in single and double
metonymies. It states that “only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available
for anaphoric reference” (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 304). The matrix domain is
preferred in anaphoric reference because it is usually more clearly profiled,
unambiguous, and informationally richer. The CMA is a general restriction to metonymic
mappings that applies in terms of economy and relevance for the hearer, as it prevents
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cases of metonymic anaphora from entailing an excessive processing effort. According
to the CMA:
Whenever anaphoric reference is made to a metonymic noun phrase, the anaphoric pronoun
cannot have an independent metonymic interpretation, different from the one assigned to its
antecedent. In most cases this formulation of the CMA amounts to stating that the anaphoric
pronoun cannot be metonymic itself. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 308).
Generally, the CMA caters for cognitive economy by avoiding the activation of two
different metonymic mappings in cases of metonymic anaphora. More specifically, it
prevents cases wherein a metonymy works as the antecedent for an – in turn –
metonymic anaphoric pronoun whose metonymic interpretation is different from that of
the antecedent in question.
Consider the following examples; (1) is the original example extracted from SWM,
and (1’), (1’’), and (1’’’) are further developments of the metonymy proposed in order to
show how DAP and CMA work:
(1) He [Bush] bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did. (SWM)
(1’) Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then he discovered Hussein’s
hiding place.
(1’’) *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then he came back to the air base.
(1’’’) *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then they came back to the air
base.
(1) conveys a T-IN-S RULER FOR ARMY metonymy where the ruler (matrix domain) is
selected for anaphoric reference as predicted by the DAP (cf. Figure 1). Although (1’)
presents a metonymic anaphoric pronoun, it is not ruled out by the CMA, as the
metonymic mapping in the antecedent is not different from that of the pronoun. It could
be stated that as long as the same metonymy develops in the same stretch of discourse
(including anaphoric pronouns) anaphoric pronouns can be metonymical themselves.
(1’) also follows the DAP, as the reference is still made to the matrix domain of the
metonymic mapping (Bush). On the contrary, even though (1’’) follows the DAP (the
pronoun draws on the same RULER FOR AIR FORCE metonymy), the sentence is not
acceptable because it flouts the CMA: the anaphoric pronoun would require a different
metonymic reading from the one developed by its expected antecedent so as to be
compatible with the extended sentence. Thus, in this kind of metonymies, the DAP and
CMA also govern the compatibility of predicates with such pronouns (Ruiz de Mendoza;
Díez, 2004). Finally, (1’’’) is not acceptable because, despite it follows the CMA, it makes
reference to the target domain, i.e. to the subdomain of the metonymic mapping, thus
flouting the DAP. In this regard, and as far as the English language is concerned, the DAP
proves indeed a rather valuable tool to determine which of the metonymic components
operates as the matrix domain. In this example, “Bush” cannot count as a subdomain of
the air force – that is, the commander-in-chief as a part of the whole US air force –
because it is the only metonymic antecedent eligible for anaphoric reference. 
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Figure 1: T-IN-S metonymy
Since the CMA is a constraint rather than a principle per se, it will not be further
referred to in the remaining of this paper so as to devote special attention to the actual
principles at work in each example – it must be born in mind, nevertheless, that it still
applies in the examples tackled in this section.
In the rest of it, a series of examples illustrate the functioning of the DAP in simple
metonymies in order to ascertain whether their acceptability is predicted by Ruiz de
Mendoza and his co-workers’ account on metonymic anaphora.
Examples (2) to (5) convey T-IN-S metonymies wherein personal and relative
pronouns act as anaphoric devices referring to the matrix domain of the metonymic
antecedent (that is, the source domain), thus following the prescriptions of the DAP:
(2) No, I’m talking about a perceived notion that we Americans are supporting Israel in its
oppression of the Palestinian people. (DWMC)
(3) It took the bankruptcy of Enron before thousands of its conservative employees […]
woke up. (DWMC)
(4) That’s why, on behalf of 234 million Americans held hostage, I have requested that
NATO do what it did in Bosnia and Kosovo… (SWM)
(5) Thanks to those who helped me research and pull this book together and keep it as
timely as possible. (SWM)
Example (2) involves a COUNTRY FOR ARMED FORCES T-IN-S metonymy in which the
matrix domain (Israel) is selected as the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun, thus
following the DAP. Example (3) is an instance of a COMPANY FOR MANAGEMENT T-IN-S
metonymy whose matrix (source) domain is selected as the referent of the anaphoric
pronoun in compliance with the DAP. Example (4) works according to an ORGANIZATION
FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymy. The fact that the anaphoric pronoun here refers to the
matrix domain – the organization – and not directly to its representatives – e.g. by using
they – indicates that (4) follows the DAP. Finally, (5) instantiates a T-IN-S metonymy
(BOOK FOR CONTENTS) where the matrix-source domain is the physical book and the
target domain is identified with the book contents (comprehensively written, elaborated,
and “pulled together”). In accordance with the usage of book in (5), this metonymy –
which also develops in the pronoun – makes reference to the contents, but the anaphoric
pronoun – following the DAP – still makes reference to the matrix domain. 
Bush
Source
Army/air force
Target
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The following examples convey S-IN-T metonymies (cf. Figure 2) active in the
antecedent of different kinds of anaphoric reference devices. Notice that the matrix
domain corresponds to the target domain in S-IN-T metonymies. Consider first examples
(6) and (7):
(6) […] he flagged down a gypsy cab and offered him a hundred dollars to take him home.
(DWMC)
(7) Assuming this was just another one of those talking ex-military heads who had sprung
up all over our networks, I was ready to keep flipping. (DWMC)
In (6) the DAP applies in a S-IN-T metonymy (CAR FOR DRIVER) whose matrix domain
(the taxi driver) becomes the antecedent of the anaphoric personal pronoun him. The use
of him – in compliance with Kövecses and Radden’s (1998) principles of general
cognitive saliency via the “controlling entity over controlled entity” pattern – rules out
the taxi itself as eligible for the matrix domain. It is important to note how this
metonymic mapping paves the way for a simple and quick inferential process from taxi
to its driver within our frame knowledge of taxies in particular and vehicles in general.
Example (7) shows a HEAD FOR LEADER S-IN-T metonymy where the target domain
(leader) is identified with the matrix domain. This example follows the DAP, as it is the
target domain that is used for anaphoric reference; hence the use of the relative pronoun
who instead of which (which would make reference to the source domain). 
Figure 2. S-IN-T mapping
Now consider example (8), which presents two different metonymies that work
together to yield the full sense of the Texan’s utterance:
(8) A telephone rang sharply behind her, shattering the silence of the hallway. Startled,
Gabrielle turned. The sound was coming from the closet in the foyer – a cellphone in
the pocket of one of the visitor’s coats. ‘‘Scuse me, friends,’ a Texas drawl said in the
den. ‘That’s me’ (DP)
The use of that in (8) might be regarded as a common case of deictic reference
through which the demonstrative calls for the ringing cell phone. However, it might also
be argued that the demonstrative makes reference to the sound (the ringing of the cell
Source
Target
(matrix)
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phone), as it is a perceptually outstanding feature in the context of the example: The cell
phone is in the hallway, and its ringing sound becomes more relevant in that it is what
actually reaches the room where the Texan and other people are reunited, thus
interrupting their conversation and making the Texan utter his statement. This second
interpretation entails a high-level EFFECT FOR CAUSE S-IN-T metonymy wherein the target-
matrix domain (the cell phone) is identified with the cause of the sound, whereas its
effects (the ringing) remain as the source-subdomain. Even though the matrix-cause
domain is usually preferred as the antecedent for anaphoric reference, the instance under
analysis is somehow more intricate given that the demonstrative seems to make
reference instead to the subdomain (that is, the ringing sound). This seems possible
because, in accordance with the contextual information, both domains are available for
the anaphoric reference expressed by that. Finally, the fact that the effect and not the
cause is selected as the antecedent for the demonstrative is corroborated by the local
perceptual prominence acquired by the sound of the telephone (source and subdomain
of the mapping) over its origin (the cell phone). 
According to this line of reasoning, that triggers an EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy
that leads us to the cause of the sound – i.e. the cell phone. This referent is still active in
our mind when we reach the pronoun me, thus paving the way for the inferential process
required for the correct understanding of the OWNER FOR POSSESSION T-IN-S metonymy
activated by the personal pronoun in the example. In this metonymy, as predicted by one
of principles of general cognitive saliency (owner prevails over the possession in the
selection of matrix domain of a metonymic mapping), the source domain identified with
the owner acts as a point of access leading to the target domain – that is, the possession
or cell phone. 
3.2. Double Metonymies. DAP, DCP and DPP
Simple metonymies are not the only kind of metonymies in common discourse.
Some more complex examples involve two mappings from two sources to two targets
connected by one shared domain. These are cases of double metonymies (Ruiz de
Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004), and can be regarded as two
intertwined simple metonymies with one common domain but with two different matrix
domains.
Although the DAP also applies in double metonymies, this principle on its own fails
to fully account for the relationship and hierarchy among domains, especially when
determining which is the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference. In this
respect, Ruiz de Mendoza and his co-workers have proposed two additional principles
to predict the matrix domain selection for anaphoric reference in double metonymies: the
DCP and the DPP. These principles are arranged in a hierarchy at the top of which there
lies the DAP (as it is the only one that applies to both kinds of metonymies and rules the
matrix domain selection in all examples of metonymic anaphora), followed by the DCP
and then by the DPP. The degrees of acceptability of particular examples may depend on
the principles they meet or override, and the hierarchical rank of such principles (Ruiz
de Mendoza and Díez, 2004). The prevalence of the DCP over the DPP seems to be due to
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its semantic nature, as opposed to the more formal grounds of the DPP. Both of them
predict the selection of the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference in double
metonymies, but on different grounds. The DCP states that:
Whenever two domains are available for anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun, we
intend to select the domain that is semantically more compatible with the predicate of the
sentence containing the anaphoric pronoun. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 311).
According to the DPP:
In cases of double metonymic mappings, unless the predicate combines better with the final
matrix domain, reference is preferably made to the initial matrix domain. (Ruiz de Mendoza;
Díez, 2004: 312).
The importance and applicability of these principles is better perceived through
specific examples. In (9), two metonymic mappings are necessary to account for the
intended meaning of the italicized words:
(9) “Captain,” Sophie said, her tone dangerously defiant, “the sequence of numbers you
have in your hand happens to be one of the most famous mathematical progressions in
history.” Fache was not aware there even existed a mathematical progression that
qualified as famous, and he certainly didn’t appreciate Sophie’s off-handed tone. “This
is the Fibonacci sequence,” she declared, nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache’s
hand. “A progression in which each term is equal to the sum of the two preceding
terms.” (TDVC)
Example (9) presents a demonstrative pronoun acting as a cataphoric referential
device. According to the context provided in the example, this makes direct reference to
the piece of paper in Fache’s hand (“This is the Fibonacci sequence,” she declared,
nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache’s hand”).2 However, Sophie’s words also
seem to identify this with the Fibonacci sequence – the inferential process necessary for
the understanding of this example requires a double metonymical mapping exemplified
in Figure 3.
Firstly, the piece of paper referred to by Sophie becomes the source-matrix domain
of a T-IN-S metonymy (CONTAINER/PIECE OF PAPER FOR CONTENT/WRITING) that entails a
domain reduction process whose target is the actual inscription in the paper. Secondly,
the target domain of the first T-IN-S metonymy becomes the source domain of a different
S-IN-T metonymy wherein the writing is conceived of as a sample of the actual
progression (SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE). This second metonymy entails a domain expansion
process leading to the actual sequence (the second target-matrix domain).
The existence of two matrix domains poses a problem in determining which of
them is selected as the actual referent for the cataphoric this, as both of them might at
2. In The Da Vinci Code, Sophie is a cryptographer who has just deciphered a sequence of numbers and
has identified it as the beginning of “the Fibonacci sequence”. Sophie wrote the sequence of numbers
on a piece of paper and, as described in the example, hands it in to Fache, the captain of Paris police
department.
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first sight qualify as proper referents. The explicit reference to the piece of paper in the
example (“nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache’s hand”) suggests that this may
select the first matrix domain (the piece of paper) as its referent, thus following the
prescriptions of the DPP, but flouting the DCP. Albeit the DCP ranks hierarchically higher
than the DPP, the context makes explicit the reference to the initial matrix domain, thus
sanctioning it as semantically acceptable in this example.
Figure 3. PAPER FOR WRITING/SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE
Now consider the double metonymy involved in (10):
(10) The wealthy did everything they could to encourage this attitude. Understand that in
1980, only 20 percent of Americans owned a share of stock. Wall Street was the rich
man’s game and it was off-limits to the average Joe and Jane. And for good reason —
the average person saw it for what it was, a game of risk, and when you are trying to
save every dollar so you can send the kids to college, games of chance are not where
you place your hard-earned money. (DWMC)
(10) involves two T-IN-S metonymies linked by the target subdomain of the first
mapping, which becomes the source domain for the second one as shown in Figure 4:
Figure 4. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT
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piece of paper
writing/
sample
place
activity
institution
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Wall Street is a street in lower Manhattan where the New York Stock Exchange is
located. However, in the example, Wall Street is not conceived as the physical place but
rather as a game, an activity (the stock exchange) that is not available for the average
middle-low class due to the high amounts of money necessary to get involved in it. The
double metonymical mapping develops as follows: The first metonymical mapping goes
from the physical street onto the financial institution physically located in this street. The
mapping in question is embodied in a PLACE FOR INSTITUTION T-IN-S metonymy wherein
the physical street is the source and first matrix domain, and the institution (Stock
Market) qualifies as the target subdomain. In the second T-IN-S metonymical mapping
(INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT) the institution becomes the source domain
and qualifies as the second matrix domain available for the anaphoric reference of the
pronoun it. Hence, this second domain-reduction process leads to the actual intended
meaning of Wall Street, i.e., the activity developed in such an institution – e.g., the Stock
Market movements and exchanges – which is, in turn, conceptualized metaphorically as
a game of chance. Due to the specific way in which Wall Street is used in this example,
the first matrix domain (place) is discarded as the antecedent selected for the anaphoric
reference of it, which flouts the DPP. The DCP applies instead, as the institution (second
matrix domain) seems more semantically compatible with the predicate of the sentence
in which Wall Street and it are found.
3.3. Implicative Reference
Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators have proposed what they call implicative
reference to account for apparently problematic cases when dealing with some examples
of metonymy and anaphoric reference under their approach (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez,
2004). According to their postulates, a first look at this kind of examples may (mis)lead
us to regard a metonymy as the antecedent of an anaphoric device which, instead of
referring to the matrix domain, appears to make reference to one subdomain – thus
flouting the DAP. 
They suggest that, very often, in these cases no metonymic reference is made to
either domain: a closer examination reveals that the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun
does not refer to the metonymy (the DAP does not apply and thus cannot be flouted), but
to an element in a frame previously activated in the sentence. In order to describe the
importance of implicative reference in explaining these cases, a series of these
“problematic” examples ((11)-(14)) will be analyzed in accordance with their proposals.
(11) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together by officials from
the Saudi Embassy… (DWMC)
Accordingly, in (11) there is no anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent, for
the pronoun they does not refer to the subjects reporting the information in question,
which would qualify as the target – and subdomain – of a T-IN-S metonymy, thus flouting
the DAP. Instead, they refers to the group of professionals working at The New York
Times. By mentioning The New York Times, the author automatically activates a frame
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wherein all elements become potential referents for the anaphoric pronoun. Hence, they
sanctions only one of these implicated frame elements (i.e. the group of professionals)
as its intended antecedent.
It seems common to find cases of implicative reference when collective nouns are
used as potential antecedents for anaphoric reference devices (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez
2004). This is corroborated in many of the examples extracted from Moore’s books, as
instantiated by (12) and (13) below:
(12) The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein’s country, but
the White House quashed the idea. Their reasons? According to [...]. (DWMC)
(13) The right knows this because they look at the numbers, they read the reports, and they
live in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And
they hate it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, they lie. (DWMC)
In these examples the antecedent for they is not the target of the three T-IN-S
metonymies of the kind INSTITUTION FOR PERSONNEL-IN-CHARGE ((12)), and ORGANIZATION
FOR ITS MEMBERS ((13)). The DAP is not overridden because no reference is made to a
metonymic element, but to a frame element activated by the White House and the right
respectively. These personal pronouns take the antecedents personnel-in-charge of the
White House and the members of the right; however, these are not referentially available
via metonymic mappings but via implicative reference. Notwithstanding this, metonymic
anaphoric reference might have been rightfully used in these examples by using its instead
of they, thus referring to the source and matrix domains of each metonymy and following
the DAP. It follows then that metonymy and implicative reference may be used
interchangeably as evidenced in examples (12’) and (13’).3
(12’) The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein’s country, but
the White House quashed the idea. Its reasons? According to [...]. (Modified from
DWMC)
(13’) The right knows this because it looks at the numbers, it reads the reports, and it lives
in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And it
hates it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, it lies. (Modified from DWMC)
Implicative reference occurs not only with personal pronouns, but with other kinds
of anaphoric devices like, for example, relatives as in (14) and (15):
(14) There would be no pipeline. The Taliban were out the loot, and the companies who
supported you had now lost millions themselves on all the prep that went into this
lucrative pipeline. (DWMC)
(15) Most of these were countries (such as Tonga, Azerbaijan, and Palau) who always get
picked last for United Nations volleyball games [...]. (DWMC)
As in previous examples, in (14) the use of who hints at the fact that the item
sanctioned as its antecedent is not an element of the UNION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S
3. The metaphor underlying the right has been left unexplained to focus on the main concern of this study.
CLR-Nº 5-CORREC  28/5/08  11:52  Página 86
ANTONIO JOSÉ SILVESTRE LÓPEZ Metonymy and Anaphoric Reference 87
metonymy underlying the use of companies. Note that for the matrix domain of the
metonymy to be licensed as the antecedent in compliance with the DAP, which should
have been employed instead. However, the use of who, which in case of a metonymic
interpretation would break the DAP, suggests that this is a case of implicative reference
to a frame element activated by companies: Our frame knowledge of company structures
(particularly their power distribution and tasks) allows us to pick the management
committee of those companies as the antecedent for who. Similarly, in (15) the U.N.
representatives of each country constitutes the antecedent of who, which is accessed
through implicative reference.
The discussion above shows how Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators’ theory
explains these apparently problematic cases by way of the activation of two alternative
operations; it seems possible that speakers or writers may select as the antecedent for
anaphoric reference either the matrix domain of a metonymy or an implicated element
of a frame activated by the use of certain terms. 
3.3.1. Metonymy and Implicative Reference in Interaction
However, it is also possible to find metonymy and implicative reference in
interaction within the same stretches of discourse. The following example shows how a
metonymy and a case of implicative reference may draw on the same antecedent, albeit
through different inferential paths:
(16) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together by officials from
the Saudi Embassy, which feared that they might become the victims of American
reprisals. (DWMC)
The use of which here might seem grammatically incorrect, as its expected
antecedent should be officials from the Saudi Embassy, which compels the use of who.
The fact that which is used instead suggests that the actual antecedent is not officials
from the Saudi Embassy, but only the Saudi Embassy. Nevertheless, they is used
immediately after making clear reference to the officials. This apparent contradiction
poses no problem and has indeed a simple explanation. Metonymy and implicative
reference are combined in this example. Which makes reference to the source of a T-IN-
S metonymy of the kind INSTITUTION FOR ITS MEMBERS, and follows the predictions of the
DAP. They, however, does not make reference to the target domain of the metonymy (i.e.
the officials). It is a case of implicative reference to an element of the frame activated by
the Saudi Embassy and thus does not involve any metonymical antecedent.
Examples (17) to (20) below show how anaphoric phenomena may help to uncover
different conceptualizations of reality in the same piece of discourse:
(17) Reluctantly, they finally agreed — but then they sought to block the investigative body
from doing its job by stonewalling them on the evidence that they sought. (DWMC)
(18) […] what if, during the late 1990s, the Republicans had let the FBI do its real job —
protecting the lives of our citizens — instead of having them spend countless hours
investigating the sex habits of the president […]? (DWMC)
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These examples show how the source domains of these two ORGANIZATION FOR ITS
MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymies (the investigative body in (17), the FBI in (18)) become the
antecedent of the possessive adjective its. These metonymies, however, do not seem to
work as reference points for the third person plural pronouns in the examples. These
pronouns make reference to the members working in each organization/association;
namely, the members of the investigative body and the FBI agents. This is so because,
whereas its refers anaphorically to the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping, they and
them take their referent from an element of the particular frame activated by the
investigative body and the FBI respectively.
In the light of these examples – provided that anaphoric reference to a metonymic
antecedent and the implicated reference to a frame element are accepted as two distinct
and complementary processes –, Ruiz de Mendoza’s proves a highly comprehensive
approach with compelling explanations for many examples of anaphoric reference that
could not be easily tackled before.
Nonetheless, further reflection on the nature of both phenomena might lead us to
consider an alternative option. It could be contended that most – if not all – of the
discourse items that purportedly activate a given frame in the mind of the interlocutors
might also count as the source of a metonymic mapping in most of these examples. Take,
for instance, example (11’):
(11’) The New York Times reported the case in all detail.
The analysis of The New York Times in (11’) would “normally” call for a T-IN-S
COMPANY FOR EMPLOYEES metonymy wherein the source-matrix domain is the company
and the target domain is the actual employee or employees in charge of the report. As far
as this sentence is concerned, there seems to be little doubt about The New York Times
acting as a metonymic device. However, consider again example (11):
(11) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together […]
The New York Times here is no longer regarded as the source and matrix domain of
a metonymic mapping potentially eligible for anaphoric reference, but as a discourse
stretch activating a given frame (e.g. journalism) of which certain elements (the
journalists) are sanctioned as the anaphoric antecedent.
It is certainly arguable whether the expansion of these examples to facilitate the
introduction of an anaphoric device might be a reliable test for the application of the DAP;
and hence for the classing of the sentence as a case of metonymic anaphora (if the DAP
holds and reference is made to the matrix domain) or implicative reference (if the DAP is
flouted). The point here, however, is that the classing of certain examples as cases of
implicative reference seems to be made somehow “a posteriori” once the DAP does not
hold, which entails an a priori consideration of the item referred to as a metonymic
mapping. That is to say, in certain examples, as (11’) and (11), it seems as if cases of
implicative reference were classed as such once the anaphoric device in hand does not
take on the matrix domain of a potential metonymic antecedent.
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Perhaps it might be necessary to develop a bit further the nature of the connections
between metonymic anaphora and implicative reference to a frame or script element (as
well as their most common appearance loci in discourse).
Some examples are indeed plain cases of implicative reference, as in “The
mushroom omelette was too spicy. He left without paying” (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez,
2004: 306; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002: 129), which these scholars quote from Stirling
(1996: 82). In it, the use of he in the second sentence is licensed by the activation of the
restaurant script. However, there are more obscure cases of implicative reference, for
example: “I called the garage and they will have the car ready by tomorrow” (Ruiz de
Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 314). While no metonymy seems to be involved in the first
example, these scholars propose that, in the second one there is indeed a T-IN-S
metonymy; nevertheless, they hold that they does not select it for anaphoric reference,
but rather one part of the frame activated by garage. 
Another noteworthy point here is that it might be possible to contend – just as in
Koch’s (1999) approach to metonymy, which basically proposes that metonymic
mappings take place within frames – that further metonymic mappings may underlie
these cases of implicative reference. These metonymic mappings, however, would not be
active until the very moment of the use of the pronoun in the sentence.
In the case of (11), for example, it could be argued that The New York Times triggers
off the frame of journalism; nevertheless, no metonymic mapping might be active as far
as the use of The New York Times is concerned. The metonymy would apply once the
anaphoric pronoun they was used. This frame might thus be taken as the domain over
which metonymic operations are performed. After all, the selection of the subjects in
charge of the reporting is but the selection of a part (or parts) of the frame-matrix
domain.
Consequently, this process might be considered as a T-IN-S PART FOR WHOLE
metonymic mapping. Interestingly enough, since they still makes reference to the
subdomain of the relationship, the DAP does not apply either. The important issue to be
born in mind here is that it might be possible that the phenomenon of implicative
reference to a frame element does not hold the same cognitive status as metonymic
mappings.
Ruiz de Mendoza’s approach is fairly powerful and comprehensive, and it easily
explains many previously troublesome cases; all the examples analyzed in this study as
cases of implicative reference may well be accepted as such, which allows for a neat
explanation of these phenomena. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to provide a
thorough sketch of the cognitive processes that yield the activation of (i) a metonymy
(with one of its elements being sanctioned as the antecedent of an anaphoric device) and
(ii) a frame element working as the antecedent of an anaphoric device.
A detailed description of the processes (both cognitive and linguistic) that underlie
both phenomena might cast some more light on this issue. It might be useful to draw
finer distinctive lines between the functioning of cognitive operations like metonymic
mappings or the triggering of frames, and the way in which they are actually reflected in
language. This description, besides, might yield some conclusions concerning whether
there is some kind of cognitive or linguistic gradation as regards “metonymic anaphora”
and “implicative reference”.
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That linguistic structure does not reflect conceptual structure in full detail should be
taken into account in this regard, as the aforementioned principles might apply to
language, but may not necessarily do so in such a strict way in our minds.
4. Conclusion
In compliance with the aims of this paper, empirical evidence regarding the
comprehensiveness and systematicity of Ruiz de Mendoza’s approach to metonymy and
anaphora has been provided by means of the analysis of a series of real examples in
English extracted from a database of four books. 
The distinction between T-IN-S and S-IN-T metonymies proposed by Ruiz de
Mendoza has shown highly functional to account for certain examples that would have
posed problems for other accounts on the same phenomena. Likewise, this approach
shows indeed how metonymy has an impact on grammar – i.e., how the principles
underlying anaphoric reference are not fully grammatical but deeply grounded on
conceptual processes.
The theoretical contentions and analytical procedures proposed by these scholars
regarding the application of a metonymic antecedent or an element of a previously
activated frame in certain cases of anaphoric reference have also been illustrated with
commented examples. The relationship between metonymic anaphora and implicative
reference – as well as their interaction in discourse – has been dealt with in more detail,
with the resulting conclusion that further research is needed in this particular area, as the
borderlines between both phenomena seem to overlap in a number of cases.
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